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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No, 960051-CA 
v. : 
ALPHONSO P. MONTANO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the 
State/Appellant's Opening Brief (State Br.), the State submits 
the following points in reply to the statements and arguments 
contained in defendant's Responsive Brief (Def. Br.). 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF 
THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Defendant's Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
fail to set forth the applicable standards of appellate review as 
required under rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Instead, defendant merely recites standards he believes are 
applicable to a magistrate's evaluation of evidence. The 
inaccuracies of defendant's interpretation of the evidentiary and 
legal standards applicable to preliminary hearings will be 
discussed in the argument portion of this brief. But whatever 
standards apply, defendant's substitution of trial court 
evidentiary standards for appellate court review standards is 
inappropriate. The proper standards of appellate review are 
contained in the State's brief (State Br. at 2-3 & 5 n.2.) 
ARGUMENT 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING COURT ERRED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO VIEW THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
INFORMATION AND REFUSED TO CREDIT THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM BECAUSE IT WAS JUST 
HER "WORD" AGAINST DEFENDANT 
fteply to Defendant's Argument that 
a Preliminary Hearing Magistrate 
May Refuse to Bind Over Based on 
ffis Subjective Assessment pf the 
Victim's Credibility 
Defendant correctly states that Utah law permits a 
preliminary hearing magistrate to assess credibility, but then 
improperly interprets this to mean that a magistrate may refuse 
to bind over whenever, in the magistrate's subjective opinion, a 
victim's testimony is "not believable." See Def. Br. at 15-20. 
Defendant's argument fundamentally misinterprets a magistrate's 
role. 
» 
When a preliminary hearing magistrate assesses 
evidence, he must do so objectively. State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (preliminary hearing magistrate is 
2 
required to view evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and bind over unless the evidence is "wholly lacking 
and incapable of reasonable inference" to support an element) 
(quoting and applying directed verdict standard enunciated in 
Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)). Under this 
objective standard, it is improper for a magistrate to "accept 
the defendant's version of the facts over the legitimate 
inferences which can be drawn from the [State's] evidence." 
People v. District Court. 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1990) (cited 
with favor in Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229). "Weighing the merits 
of the case is for the trier of fact at trial." Id. Accord 
Cruz. 660 P.2d at 728 ("In directing a verdict the trial court 
may not weigh the evidence.") See also State Br. at 23-25. 
Despite this, defendant argues, in essence, that 
Pledger recognizes a subjective standard, a standard defendant 
claims was established in State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 
1980), St?te V, Giles/ 576 P.2d 876 (Utah 1978), and State v. 
Wodskow. 896 P.2d 29 (Utah 1995). Defendant's interpretation is 
wrong and relies on a superficial reading of those cases. While 
Anderson. £jJLs£, and Wodskow generally comment on a magistrate's 
right to assess credibility, none of the cases were decided on 
this ground. State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1991) 
3 
(appellate court is not bound by earlier dicta). To the extent 
that these decisions are applicable, they are consistent with 
more recent and on-point case law requiring a magistrate to 
adjudge credibility only when, as a matter of law, a witness's 
testimony is inherently implausible or incredible. State v. 
Jaeaer, 896 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Utah App. 1995) (preliminary hearing 
magistrate may not decide questions arising from "credible, but 
conflicting evidence"). See also Cruz. 660 P.2d at 728-729 (in 
directing a verdict, the trial judge does not determine issues of 
credibility except as a matter of law) (recognized as preliminary 
hearing standard in Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229). Accord Hunter v. 
District Court. 543 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Colo. 1975) (a preliminary 
hearing court's inquiry into credibility is limited to the 
"plausibility of the story and not general trustworthiness"). 
The Pledger/Jaeger/Cruz objective standard is not novel. 
Instead, it is consistent with the objective standard imposed in 
all prejudgement determinations of sufficiency of evidence. See 
State Br. at 24. 
While Anderson recognized that a preliminary hearing is 
a critical stage in a criminal prosecution, it did not grant 
preliminary hearing magistrates greater authority than trial 
judges to assess the credibility and reliability of evidence. 
4 
Cf. Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783 & 786. Instead, Anderson in two 
footnotes referred to the Massachusetts' directed verdict rule 
which recognized that "credibility is ordinarily a matter for the 
jury, and it is not expected that judges will normally resolve 
testimonial conflicts at the preliminary hearing," while 
acknowledging that "cases do occasionally arise in which a 
witness's testimony is so weak or contradicted by sufficiently 
clear facts that the judge should have the power to dismiss the 
case." Anderson. 612 P.2d at 783 n.19 (quoting Myers v. 
Commonwealth. 298 N.E.2d 819, 826 n.12 (Mass. 1973)). See also 
Anderson. 612 P.2d at 783 n.12 (under prima facie/directed 
verdict standard, a preliminary hearing magistrate may only 
refuse to bind over when "xa trial court would be bound to acquit 
as a matter of law'," quoting Myers. 298 N.E.2d at 824.) 
The Anderson/Myer directed verdict standard is no 
different from the Pledger/Cruz standard and both are consistent 
with the objective standard imposed anytime a court removes a 
case from jury consideration. Unless acting as the ultimate 
fact-finder, courts may only assess witness credibility in the 
unusual circumstance where the testimony is inherently 
improbable, that is: "there must exist either a physical 
impossibility of the evidence being true, or its falsity must be 
5 
apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." State 
v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (arrest of judgment). 
£££ $qgp Si-rut? v, BeggtQn CorPt/ 659 P.2d 799, 806 (Kan. 1983) 
(a court may only disregard evidence when it is "clearly contrary 
to some immutable law of physics or is hopelessly in conflict 
with one or more established and uncontroverted physical facts") 
(quoted with approval in Workman. 852 P.2d at 984). 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Wodskow. 896 P.2d 29, 
is also misplaced. In Wodskow, the issue was whether it was 
proper for a district court to "reverse" a magistrate's factual 
finding that based on their testimony and demeanor, the child 
victims had experienced "substantial emotional pain," an element 
of the crime, without reviewing a complete transcript of the 
lower court proceedings. Id. at 31-32 & n.l. The Wodskow 
ruling, that reversal may not be predicated on review of an 
incomplete record, is not unique to motions to quash. Without a 
complete record of the prior proceedings, any reviewing court 
must presume the regularity of the prior proceedings and affirm 
the lower court judgment. See State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 
1388 (Utah 1988); Call v. City of West Jordan. 788 P.2d 1049, 
1053, cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1990). 
Similarly, the issue in fiilfiS/ 576 P.2d 876, was only 
6 
tangentially related Lo preliminary hearings; the real issu- was 
whether a city judge conid be held JH contempt • 
cornhuM H seM'1! uii I p u I i mi nar^ hearing when directed to by the 
district court ld.L at 878 Following the first preliminary 
hearing and bindover, defei ise att< dJ ii^ jed I lid I niv witness 
1 la i perjured himself. Id. The district court ordered a remand. 
When the magistrate failed to conduct a second preliminary 
•'MM r 'h"'1"! 1 he magistrate for contempt. 
In concluding that there was no basis to hold the magistrate in 
contempt, the supreme court isLated llii.il e\ t"n if Mi i e liad been 
y auring Lnr= preliminary hearing, "Lilt could not 
oe said as a i :^?.-j . r " . - ' " -;" "h~ judge conducting the 
pre.. ..m:.-- , .. v-. nut 
other evxaence sufficient L_ cause T committing magistrate -
find probable cause that the defendant was the one wh 
i IIH Mfieiiisi" < "liai q^d |ij , .if B" '>» (emphasis added). The court 
then held that i n ruling on a motion to quash, a district court 
limitec ^ ^n o tl le pi ocedi ;ii es siii: :i : oi ind I ng the 
preliminary hearing, and *— — 'nature and character" of the 
evidence. Id. "*" orws Again, vv.. Giles contains generalized 
languag whom he 
chose," id. at 879, in context, the decision does not adopt a 
7 
subjective standard over an objective one. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, sufficiency -- and 
therefore, credibility --is only at issue in probable cause 
determinations to the extent that the court can say, as a matter 
of law, that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
allegations. Pledger/ 896 P.2d at 1229. Cf. State v. Humphrey. 
823 P.2d 464, 465-66 (a district court's review of a bindover 
order is solely to determine if, as a matter of law, the court's 
jurisdiction has been properly invoked). See also State's Br. at 
26-27. 
Utah's imposition of an objective standard follows the 
majority view. As discussed in the State's Opening Brief at 25, 
the Colorado Supreme Court views the issue as jurisdictional: A 
preliminary hearing court has authority to ''consider the 
credibility of witnesses only when, as a matter of law, the 
testimony is implausible or incredible." Hunter v. District 
Court. 543 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Colo. 1975). Accord People in 
Interest of M.V.. 742 P.2d 326, 329 (Colo. 1987). See also 
People v. Superior Court (Kneip). 268 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 6 Dist. 1990) ("the evidence need not be unambiguous for 
purposes of a bindover; raising a reasonable possibility of guilt 
suffices"); State v. Patterson. 570 A.2d 174, 179 (Conn. 1990) 
8 
("when reviewing a motion t o dismiss an information, the 
p r o f f e r e d p i o o t i s I i i I H ">" i i wi -i 1 nn u. I t .1 <rr u H I > I 7 I > • I I IH s f a t e" ) ; 
People v. Moore, 446 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Mich Ct App 1989) ("if 
the preliminary examination evidence conflicts or raises a 
."^n.'/i.'Jidl U- di Li1 " T':jH'ird i J---1 • defendant's guilt, this question is 
properly left for J judge .*v "ria", a-^ -\* b i d i n g 
ovpr . *... defence
 A.-. . j ,. 
:,i^ v. Pedrie. .*. ^.2d 859, 862 (Colo. 
1986) -\ .estimony conflicts, ~ priest i"-^  c: :act exists for 
th^ "i .: ; 4 :-:- - idvorabic to the 
prosecution"/; stats ex relt FunmflKer v> Klemnw 317 N W 2d 4 58, 
*
r
" 'W: r- -toq^\ '"*-^o purpose c: -he nrp »-: t 
on cue credibility wi ~ *-.cnesb, 
court s : .- simply to ascertain the plausibility of her story 
and whether, . .; i_* 
of Buckne X, 2 o 4 IN . n . ^  ^  ~>^ , , ^^^
 y — ^^t ~ (if 
credible evidence exists to support and negate an element, a 
qut-ijl ion i,;.l i 'ii'l P >: i nt" r: wl' 1' I" ,|,|lli,|,,',ti,l d b e I C I L L U L U C _ >_ ) . 
Further, defendant £ argument that unles- a magistrate 
is allowed to subjectively ~ ,- . - - es 
r
 x. of Defendant at ^ -w, , remonstrates a 
misunderstanding of the function of probable cause 
9 
determinations. Preliminary hearings are not trials. Anderson. 
612 P.2d at 783 (preliminary hearing evidence need not be of the 
same quality or quantity as that required for conviction). While 
their functions are multiple, they are also limited. Defendants 
are entitled to know the charges and basic evidence against them 
but the prosecution is not required to produce all the evidence. 
Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229 (recognizing presumption that state's 
evidence will strengthen from preliminary hearing to trial). 
Bindovers may be predicated on otherwise inadmissible evidence, 
including unconstitutionally obtained evidence, and this 
inadmissible evidence may serve as the sole predicate for 
probable cause. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2). Only the lowest 
standard of proof is required. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229. 
Yet, defendant argues that despite the limited nature 
of a preliminary hearing, a magistrate conducting such a hearing 
should be granted greater discretion in rejecting evidence than 
any other judge at any other stage of judicial proceedings. This 
makes no sense. It would grant greater authority to a justice of 
the peace in a non-adjudicatory hearing than to a district court 
judge in trial proceedings. 
The Utah Supreme Court has wisely rejected such a 
topsy-turvy approach. Instead, magistrates are bound by the same 
10 
rules as trial judges. Pledger, 896 T.Lcl n' 122? Cruz , fC~ T 2d 
at 728-29. Neither may inva i 
\ cea to objective assessments of credibi-it-y. Ll^> Jaeger. 
896 ; 2d 4" 4f £&£ also State v, Lagtod, n*i P.?C ^  
Apt - *-sii.i ^OQMl i ' '"'* I1 J<±D (Utah 
1985), " [i] t is the exclusive function of t lie jury l.o wei gh the 
evidence and determine the credibility uJ w i L new^ i-^ . ). 
Defendant "' rrmn".ssion that the magistrate in this case engaged 
in no more than a subjective evaluation of the evidence "• 
establishes th<j "«» nf ^  " is ( Id i 
Reply to Defendant's Aggeytion that the 
Standard of Probable Cause Applicable to 
Preliminary Hearings jg Distinct from Fourth 
Amendment Probable Cause 
T ] i e state recognizes that it did not ai gue below and, 
therefore, did not preserve the argument that only ** f^ virth 
d r n t M n l i n e n ! .* I >-i i m l »i i i " ' I |™»t « »11«1111 i* i H I I I * - H I in 1 j i '. 1 i i | n * 1 i mi nri l y 
hearings. This argument was raised , ; Jaeger and Wodskow. where 
the State argued in essence that 
the probable cause needed for a bindover was 
traditionally based on a magistrate's finding 
that an offense had been, committed and that 
the defendant was %lguilty" of the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-7 (1978) (repealed). 
However, in 1980, the Utah Legislature 
amended the statute to state that a 
magistrate shall bindover after finding 
11 
probable cause to believe that the defendant 
had "committed" the offense. Utah Code Ann, 
§ 77-35-6 (a) (1982) (repealed).1 The State 
argues that because the term "committed" 
mirrors the language defining a lesser 
standard of probable cause for issuing an 
arrest warrant, the 1980 amendment must have 
been intended to equate the standard of 
probable cause needed for a bindover with 
that needed for an arrest warrant. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-5 (1995) ("A magistrate may 
issue a warrant for arrest upon finding 
probable cause to believe that the person to 
be arrested has committed a public offense.") 
Jaeger. 896 P.2d at 44(footnote and emphasis in original). See 
also Wodskow. 896 P.2d at 31. However, in both cases, this Court 
refused to reach the merits based on the State's failure to 
preserve the argument below and lack of exceptional circumstances 
to overcome this failure. 
For this reason, the State did not raise the issue in 
its opening brief in this case. Despite this, defendant devotes 
considerable argument to claim that probable cause for 
preliminary hearings requires a higher finding of probable cause 
than for arrests. See Def. Br. at 2, 11-12. Defendant appears 
to be urging this Court to openly reject the State's 
Jaeger/Wodskow argument that a prima facie- standard of probable 
1
 "The substance of this provision is now contained in Rule 7(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure/' Jaeger, 896 P.2d at 44 n.2. 
12 
cause is no longer applicable. 
While tl: le -State i s p i ee l i ided f i 01: 1: 1 a i g t id 1: ig the 11:: lie :i : :i t s , 
i t u i g e s t h e c o u r t n o t t o d e c i d e an i s s u e t h a t i s n e i t h e r b e f o r e 
t h i F Cour t n o r n e c e s s a r y f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s c a s e . No 
niRlMt.M what. TfM»f» ||
 M| f it t il ial > 11< ra i i s f appi if^ " 1 l-i 1 nviqi s t r a t e 
i m p e r m i s s i b l y found t h e v i c t i m ' s test imon_ :r.bel i e v a b l e " b a s e d 
on no more t h a n h i s s u b j e c t i v e a s sessment r • •> n^dib i 111 y. 
For t h e r e a s o n s a s s e r t e d ii n t h e S t a t e ' s o p e n i n g b r i e f 
a m i a 11 v d .11 <"»•' 1II J 1: 1 de c i s :i 01 1 ::  f 11 le ] c ; ; e 1: cc i 11 t: 
dismissing the felony information should be reversed. 
Accordingly tuir ^^zrt should remand zti:& matter to the circuit 
< . ' ^ ' nriati on and bi nd 
defendant .-;\e: : .3-. 
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